Comments

Legislating Reversions: A Mistaken Path
Leading to Drastic Results

Any changes in the law to require sponsors to share reversions
with participantscould create the wrongfunding incentives which
could further threaten [the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation's] financial security. Employers faced with owing more than
they promise are likely to deliberately cut back on funding. The
result would be that the participants will be less protected and
[the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation's] exposure will be
increased.'
INTRODUCTION

The reversion 2 of excess assets following the termination3 of a
qualified, 4 single employer, 5 defined benefit 6 plan is presently an is1. CorporateRaiding of Worker Pension Plans, Hearings Before the Employment and Housing Subcomm. of the House Comm. of Gov't Operations, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 66 (1988) [hereinafter Subcommittee] (statement of Kathleen Utgoff, Ph.D.,
Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation).
2. For the purposes of this Comment, "reversion" means returning to the sponsoring employer excess assets which remain after termination and satisfaction of all the
liabilities of a defined benefit pension plan.
The reversion is allowed under the rationale that the excess funds are in the trust due
to "erroneous actuarial computations." 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-2(b) (1987).
3. For the purposes of this Comment, "termination" will be defined as the cessation of the plan followed by the appropriate filings with the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) and, if applicable, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). See infra
note 110 and accompanying text.
4. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "qualified" defines a pension plan
which meets the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) for favorable tax
status, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1986). All references to plans assume that the

1109

sue of heated debate within Congress and the pension community.
The debate centers around disposition of any excess assets remaining
after a plan is terminated and all its liabilities7 are paid. 8 The alternatives include: (1) retaining the status quo by allowing employers to

recapture excess assets; (2) changing the system by allocating excess
assets to plan participants; or (3) a hybrid method allowing plan participants and the employer to "share" the excess funds.
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741
(ERISA), along with similar provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC), permits employers to receive reversions in terminated,
overfunded,' 0 defined benefit pension plans.11 However, over the
years an increasing number of groups have advocated changing
ERISA and IRC provisions to block further defined benefit plan
reversions.1 2
plan is qualified. Nonqualified plans are beyond the scope of this Comment.
5. This Comment will be limited to single employer plans. Single employer plans
are plans adopted by one sponsoring employer. Multiemployer plans are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
6. "Defined benefit plan" as used in this Comment is a plan other than an "individual account plan." ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1982). "Individual account
plan" is defined in ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1982).
Defined benefit plans are part of a larger grouping of plans entitled pension plans. A
pension plan is defined as follows:
A pension plan within the meaning of [Internal Revenue Code] Section 401(a)
is a plan established and maintained by an employer primarily to provide systematically for the payment of definitely determinable benefits to his employees
over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement. Retirement benefits
generally are measured by, and based on, such factors as years of service and
compensation received by the employees. The determination of the amount of
retirement benefits and the contributions to provide such benefits are not deA plan designed to provide benefits for employpendent upon profits ....
ees... will, for the purposes of Section 401(a), be considered a pension plan if
the employer contributions under the plan can be determined actuarially on the
basis of definitely determinable benefits ...
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i)(1976).
7. For the purposes of this Comment, "plan liabilities" will be defined as the
total of participant benefits due plus any other plan expenses owed at the time of plan
termination.
8. A simple hypothetical involving a reversion follows: A defined benefit pension
plan which is established in 1980 has total trust assets of $100,000 in 1988. The total
benefits earned (accrued) by the plan participants are only $75,000. The plan sponsor
who wishes to recapture this excess money will proceed to terminate the plan, pay out all

plan benefits ($75,000), and then take the remaining assets as the reversion ($25,000).
9. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982)) [hereinafter ERISA].
10. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "overfunded" will refer to a defined pension plan in which the plan assets exceed plan liabilities.
11. ERISA § 4044, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989).
12. See PBGC Proposalto Initiate a VariableRate Premium System; and Public
Comments on Administration's Pension Plan Funding and Premium Rate Proposals:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. of Ways and Means,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 293 (1987) [hereinafter PBGC Proposal Hearing] (statement of
Jacob Clayman, President of the National Council of Senior Citizens); see also PBGC
ProposalHearing, supra, at 295 (statement of Pension Rights Center); Comment, Pen-
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Proponents of changing the system rely on ERISA a and IRC 154
provisions requiring a plan to be installed for the exclusive benefit
of the participants.' 6 They argue that any excess remaining in the
trust, upon a plan termination, should be distributed to the participants of the plan. 17 Additionally, they argue that plan sponsors
abuse the system by terminating plans solely to access the excess
funds, thus reducing the participants' retirement security. i8
Congress is moving to address the alleged problems with asset reversions. 9 It has enacted legislation dealing with some of the per-

ceived abuses.2 0 However, the outcry for drastic change persists. At
this time, Congress appears to be leaning toward either severely restricting future reversions or disallowing them altogether. 2' Judging
from the last session of Congress, the current direction is toward
sion Plan Terminations and Asset Reversions: Accommodating the Interests of Employers and Employees, 19 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 257 (1985); Stein, Raiders of the Corporate
Pension Plan: The Reversion of Excess Plan Assets to the Employer, 5 AM. J. TAX
POL'Y 117 (1986).
13. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
15.
(a) Requirements for qualification:
A trust created or organized in the United States and forming part of a stock
bonus, pension, or profit sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit
of his employees and their beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified plan under
this section....
26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1986).
16. ERISA defines "participant" as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive
a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may
become eligible to receive any such benefit.
ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982).
17. This argument usually comes in the form of the claim that contributions to
the plan are in reality deferred wages for the employees; thus, any excess should revert to
them. Additionally, the argument is made that the excess should be used as cost of living
increases to the benefits earned under the plan. These cost of living increases would help
protect the benefits from the adverse effects of inflation. See infra note 103.
18. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
19. Congress has addressed reversions in both hearings and legislation. Reversions
have been the topic of recent congressional hearings. See Subcommittee, supra note 1;
see also PBGC ProposalHearing,supra note 12. Legislation has also addressed the reversion issue. See infra note 163.
20. See infra notes 100 (five year amendment period), 164 (excise tax on reversions) and accompanying text.
21. Judging from past legislative attempts to alter the law regarding reversions,
there is no reason to believe the attempts to change the law will cease. See 17 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) 157 (Jan. 15, 1990) (indicating that Sen. Metzenbaum plans to react quickly
with regard to new reversion legislation).
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limiting the amount of any reversion that a plan sponsor may take.2"
In any event, recent legislation increased the excise tax applicable to
reversions. 23 In addition, the Treasury Department recently issued an
order temporarily suspending all IRS determination letters24 for terminations with reversions.25
During its next session, Congress should think twice before taking
actions which eliminate or severely restrict asset reversions. The result of major changes in the current law may be more detrimental to
plan participants than the currently perceived inadequacies of the
system;26 any changes should take the following factors into
consideration.
First, Congress must remember that an underlying purpose of
ERISA was to stabilize the funding of defined benefit plans.2 7 One
byproduct of the promotion of adequate funding of defined benefit
plans is occasional overfunding due to increases in trust investment
return or other circumstances. 28 There is a strong preference in

favoring overfunding, as opposed to underfunding, 29 plans. However,
underfunding is the likely result of changes that eliminate reversions.
Second, the potential for underfunding defined benefit plans may
result in additional financial drain on the Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corporation (PBGC).30 The PBGC was set up by ERISA to guaran-

22. See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text. Even though the recently
passed budget reconciliation legislation deleted the reversion bills, it is highly likely they
will be reintroduced in the current session. See supra note 21.
23. The excise tax applicable to reversions has been increased from 10% to 15%.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6069, 102
Stat. 3702.
24. The determination letter states the IRS's opinion that the termination and
distribution meet IRC requirements, thus indicating that the plan's tax qualified status
remains intact.
25. The Treasury notice reads in pertinent part:
The Department of the Treasury today announced it has directed the Internal
Revenue Service to delay until May 1, 1989 the issuance of determination letters for terminating defined benefit plans with assets in excess of liabilities if all
or a portion of the excess assets are to be recovered by the employer. While the
Treasury believes the current policies regarding plan terminations are sound
and does not anticipate any changes in this area, the delay in the issuance of
the letters until May 1, 1989 will provide an opportunity for additional review
of the guidelines applicable to determination letters for terminating plans.
Treasury News Release No. NB-45 (Oct. 24 1988). As noted in the notice, the moratorium on the issuance of determination letters ended May 1, 1989.
26. See infra notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
29. For the purposes of this Comment, "underfunding" occurs when plan liabilities exceed plan assets in a defined benefit plan.
30. The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) was established by

ERISA:
(1) [T]o encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of their participants,
(2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to
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tee specific benefits in defined benefit plans. 3 ' Currently, the PBGC
has a four billion dollar deficit3 2 due to the termination of previously
underfunded plans. Removing asset reversions from the scene, and
the likely resultant underfunding of future plans, will require the
PBGC to pay even more guaranteed benefits, thus increasing its
deficit.
Third, due to the above factors, the real losers from reversion legislation may be those this legislation seeks to assist, the plan participants. Certainly, in the short term, such legislation will benefit participants in those plans with a large excess. However, if subsequent
plans terminate with assets insufficient to cover liabilities, the plan
participants end up losing.33
This Comment will address reversion issues in light of the above
mentioned factors. Part I outlines the unique nature of defined benefit plans and introduces reasons why these plans become overfunded.
Part II discusses many of the perceived abuses in the current system
which caused the outcry for change. Part III addresses the current
and future legislative atmosphere as it relates to reversion issues.
Part IV analyzes the likely results of future congressional legislation
affecting reversions. Part V presents some alternate suggestions,
which avoid serious harm to the private retirement system, for remedying the alleged abuses.
This author fears that any significant changes in the law regarding
reversions will be highly detrimental to all concerned in the private
pension system, plan participants and plan sponsors alike. Congress
should look toward alternate methods for increasing benefit security
for participants while continuing strong incentives to sponsoring employers. The suggested direction will help the system develop and
flourish; an alternate course may destroy much of the progress already made toward benefit security.
participants and beneficiaries under plans to which this title applies, and
(3) to maintain premiums established by the corporation under section 4006
[29 U.S.C. § 1306] at the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obligations under this title.
ERISA § 4002, 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1982).
31. Id.
32. PBGC Proposal Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Chairman
Pickle).
33. As will be seen, if the PBGC must pay out the benefits of an underfunded
plan, those benefits are capped at a certain level and are limited to only those benefits
which were vested before the plan terminated. Participants do not receive the benefit of
full 100% vesting as they would if the plan sponsor paid benefits (assuming the plan is
either well funded or underfunded but above the PBGC limits). See infra notes 190, 191
and accompanying text.
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I. THE NATURE OF THE BEAST AND THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM

A. The Defined Benefit Pension Plan
The unique nature of the defined benefit pension plan provides the
forum for the accumulation of excess assets which may result in a
reversion upon the plan's termination. First, as in all private 4 retirement plans, a sponsoring employer's adoption of a defined benefit
plan is voluntary. There are no requirements forcing an employer to
adopt such a plan. However, once the plan is voluntarily adopted,
certain statutorily imposed requirements must be met. 5
1. The Benefit Promise: Definitely Determinable
Benefits
36
A defined benefit plan promises to pay a participating employee
a specific benefit at retirement. 37 This benefit is calculated based on
a formula stated in the plan document. 38 Typically, this benefit calculation is based on the participant's compensation, service, or a
combination of the two.3 9 ERISA and the IRC both require these
benefits to be definitely determinable.40 Under this requirement,
"benefits are not definitely determinable if funds arising from forfeitures[ 4"] on termination of service,[42 ] or other reasons, may be used
to provide increased benefits for participants. 43 In other words, the
participant's benefit must be determined solely by the benefit
formula and accrual provisions in the plan document and may not
34. The term "private" refers to a plan established by any nongovernmental entity, A "public" plan is a plan adopted by a governmental agency or unit.
35. If the plan is to be qualified for favorable tax treatment under the Internal
Revenue Code, it must meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a), 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)
(1986).
36. See supra note 6.
37. See supra note 6.
38. ERISA provides that "[elvery employee benefit plan shall be established and
maintained according to a written instrument." ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1102(a)(1) (1982).
39. For a discussion of the factors that are included in benefit calculation along
with the general types of benefit formulas, see F. FOULKES, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK § 10-10-13 (1982); see also M. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 3.52
(West 1977 & Supp. 1982).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1976); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(25) (1986).
41. "Forfeitures" will be defined as follows:
Forfeitures are amounts contributed by the employer to provide benefits for
participants who terminated their employment before obtaining a vested right
to the contributions. Under a profit sharing plan, forfeitures may be used either
to reduce employer contributions otherwise required or to increase the individual accounts of remaining participants. . . .This flexibility is not available in
pension plans, which must use forfeitures to reduce employer contributions.
See F. FOULKES, supra note 39, at § 12-11.
42. The term "termination of service," as used in this quote, refers to the employee's termination from employment with the employer.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1976).
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increase due to forfeitures or any other factors.
2.

Benefit Accrual and Vesting

In most instances, a participant is not entitled to a full benefit
until retirement age is attained." The participant earns, or accrues,45 a portion of her benefit, usually with each year of participation46 in the plan.47 Along with benefit accrual, vesting48 provides a
method through which participants obtain nonforfeitable49 rights to
their accrued pension benefits. 50 Upon plan termination, the partici44. Retirement age may vary from plan to plan. However, both ERISA and the
IRC specify maximum normal retirement ages which plans may not exceed.
ERISA provides:
(a) Commencement date for payment of benefits. Each pension plan shall provide that unless the participant otherwise elects, the payment of benefits under
the plan to the participant shall begin no later than the 60th day after the
latest of the close of the plan year in which (1) the date on which the participant attains the earlier of age 65 or the
normal retirement age specified under the plan, or
(2) occurs the 10th anniversary of the year in which the participant commenced participation in the plan, or
(3) the participant terminates his service with the employer.
ERISA § 206(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (1982). 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14) (1986) contains a
similar provision.
45. ERISA defines "accrued benefit" as "(A) in the case of a defined benefit
plan, the individual's accrued benefit determined under the plan and. . . [is] expressed in
the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age . . . ." ERISA §
3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1982). Both ERISA and the IRC provide methods for the
calculation of the participant's accrued benefit. ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1982);
26 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1986). These rules provide the methods for the calculation of the
portion of the participant's normal retirement benefit which the participant has earned to
date.
46. M. CANAN, supra note 39, at 14-7.
47. Id. at 14-7, 14-8.
48. Vesting is the percentage of the participant's accrued benefit which has become nonforfeitable. Both ERISA and the IRC provide a variety of vesting schedules
which define the parameters of vesting as well as apply to various special circumstances.
ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1982 & Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1986).
49. The term "nonforfeitable" is defined as "a claim obtained by a participant or
his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a pension plan
which arises from the participant's service, which is unconditional, and which is legally
enforceable against the plan." ERISA § 3(19), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1982).
50. An example of how vesting and benefit accrual operate may be helpful. Assuming a vesting schedule which provides the plan participant with 20% vesting after
two years of service with the employer and 20% for each year of service thereafter (up
to 100%), and the fractional method of benefit accrual, which creates a fraction of the
participant's years of participation over the participant's total years of plan participation
at normal retirement under the plan, an employee who becomes a participant at age 25
and whose plan benefit is $1,000 per month at a normal retirement age of 65 will vest
and accrue a benefit as follows:
Year One: Since the participant will have 40 years of plan participation at normal retire-
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pant receives 100% of his or her accrued benefit. 51
3.

Actuarial Calculations and Funding

The plan sponsor's contribution to the plan is based on an actuarial determination of the amount necessary to properly fund the participants' benefits at normal retirement age. A number of different
methods for calculating the plan's contributions are allowed. 52 In addition to employing an appropriate funding method, the actuary
must utilize various other assumptions,5 3 all of which must be "reasonable. ' 54 ERISA and the IRC also provide for a funding standard
account55 for each plan. These funding standards are an attempt to
insure adequate funding of defined benefit plans,56 thus assuring57participants of the availability of adequate benefits at retirement.
B.

The Defined Contribution Plan: A Contrast

In contrast to a defined benefit plan, a defined contribution 58 plan
provides for contributions to be made to a participant's individual
ment age, the accrual fraction on year one will be 1/40. The normal retirement benefit of
$1,000 is multiplied by the accrual fraction resulting in an accrued benefit of $25. Since
the vesting schedule requires two years of service for any vesting, the participant's accrued benefit is fully forfeitable.
Year Two: The accrual fraction in the second year of plan participation is 2/40, resulting
in an accrued benefit of $50. Under the vesting schedule the participant's vested interest

is 20% or $10.
51. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(3) (1986).
52. A variety of funding techniques are provided to allow actuarial flexibility in
choosing an appropriate method to fit the anticipated plan experience. Section 412 of the
Internal Revenue Code outlines pension funding requirements. 26 U.S.C. § 412 (1986 &
Supp. 1988).
53. Besides the funding method, the actuary may employ additional assumptions
such as preretirement and postretirement mortality, preretirement and postretirement interest, turnover, and salary. These assumptions are worked in with the funding method to
attempt to closely follow the actuary's estimate of actual plan experience.
54.
[A]II costs, liabilities, rates of interest, and other factors under the plan shall
be determined on the basis of actuarial assumptions and methods which, in the
aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and
reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best
estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.
ERISA § 302(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(3) (1982).
55. ERISA § 302(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (1982 & Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C. §
412(b) (1988).
56. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text; see also PBGC Proposal
Hearing, supra note 12, at 218 (statement of the ERISA Industry Committee).
57. These funding standards provide incentives for the plan sponsor to prefund
future benefits, thus in many cases creating overfunding simply by the nature of the
funding method. See PBGC Proposal Hearing, supra note 12, at 218 (statement of
ERISA Industry Committee).
58. The term "defined contribution plan" is defined as:
a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant
and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's
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account. 59 Contributions are based on a specific formula 0 described
in the plan document."' At retirement, the participant receives the
total
amount of money in the account as his or her retirement benefit. 62 The risk of investment losses is borne by the participant,
whereas in a defined benefit plan the employer bears the risk of investment losses.6 3 If the trust makes profitable investments, the participant's retirement benefit increases. If investment performance is

poor, the participant's eventual benefit decreases. 64 Under the indiaccount, and any income, expenses, gains and loses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants' account.

ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1982).

59. The following testimony provides a synopsis of the contrast between defined
benefit and defined contribution plans.
In defined contribution plans, plan assets contributed by the plan sponsor are
allocated to the individual accounts of plan participants. In general, the benefits to be received by the participant are based on the amount contributed to
the individual account, plus earnings and less losses and expenses. Once a participant becomes vested, he or she effectively owns the assets in the account; by
definition there can be no asset reversion to the plan sponsor upon termination
of a defined contribution plan.
In defined benefit plans, benefits under the plan accrue over the worklife of a
participant according to a formula designed in the plan. When a participant
vests in a defined benefit plan, he or she becomes entitled to nonforfeitable
benefits payable at retirement. However, assets contributed by the plan sponsor
are not allocated to individual accounts. Instead, they are required by ERISA
to be held in trust for the purpose of funding the plan's legal obligations to pay
future benefits. This legal obligation to pay accrued benefits is independent of
the amount of assets in the trust. Thus, in defined benefit plans, vested participants are entitled to a benefit, but they do not have a right to any specific
portion of the trust assets.
Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 37 (statement of David M. Walker, CPA, Assistant

Sect'y for Pension and Welfare Benefits, U.S. Dep't of Labor).
60. This formula may be a specific contribution formula (i.e., 10% of pay) or an
allocation formula (i.e., the contribution will be allocated to each participant in the ratio
of his or her compensation over the total participating compensation).
61. As required for a defined benefit plan, a defined contribution plan also requires a written plan document. See supra note 38.
62. The eventual benefit received from a defined contribution plan is determined
by employer contributions, forfeitures, and investment gains or losses. In contrast, the
benefit received from a defined benefit plan is expressed when the participant enters the
plan and does not change due to any of the above factors (changes in the participant's
compensation may result in changes in the eventual benefit received).
63. See F. FOULKES, supra note 39, at § 12-13. In defined benefit plans, the plan
sponsor bears the risk of investment performance by adjusting plan contributions according to the actual experience of the plan compared with the actuary's projections of plan
experience. Thus, if, for instance, the trust investment return is lower than projected, the
sponsor must make up the difference in the plan contribution. The converse is also true if
the plan assets receive a return higher than projected (the method in which the sponsor
pays this reduced contribution is dependent upon the funding method chosen).
64. Thus, in the defined contribution plan the participant does not know what the
retirement benefit will be until retirement. In contrast, the defined benefit participant's
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vidual account method there can be no excess assets; all assets must
be allocated to participants' accounts.6 5 Thus, there are no reversions
in defined contribution plans.
C. How Reversions Occur
Technically, reversions occur when excess assets remain after plan
termination and all plan liabilities have been extinguished. This section examines actions prior to plan termination that result in
overfunding. Most commentators agree the primary reason for
overfunded plans is the large investment yield which pension trusts
received in recent years.66 According to the American Society of
Pension Actuaries (ASPA), 7 greater real rates of return' than predicted by plan actuaries and plan sponsors are responsible for this
overfunding.69 Other explanations for overfunded defined benefit
plans include the maturation of many plans which existed since the
1940s and 1950s,70 the use of conservative 7 actuarial assumptions
by plan actuaries,7 2 and recent legislation cutting back maximum
benefit limitations.7 3 Indeed, often many or all of these factors combenefit at retirement is spelled out in the plan document at the inception of the plan (of
course, benefits will change according to compensation changes and any modifications in
the plan that affect retirement benefits). Therefore, in a defined benefit plan there is no
real relation between the participant's benefits and the actual trust assets. The benefits
are calculated solely on the basis of the plan benefit and accrual formulas, while in the
defined contribution plan the trust assets equal the total accounts of all the participants.
65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
66. See Comment, supra note 12; Stein, supra note 12, at 119; 60A AM. JUR. 2D
Pensions and Retirement Funds § 949 (1988); AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PENSION ACTUARIES, AssET REVERSIONS FROM DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS: PROPOSALS OF THE

1, 6 (1985) [hereinafter ASPA]. This proposal, addressing the issues confronting reversion of excess assets from a defined benefit
plan, makes suggestions for improving the system to better effectuate the participants'
and the private pension system's interests.
67. "The American Society of Pension Actuaries is a non-profit organization
whose 2,700 members provide actuarial, consulting and administrative services to approximately 30% of the qualified retirement plans in the United States." American
Soc'y of Pension Actuaries, Memorandum to All Senators (Sept. 6, 1988) (on file with
author).
68. As used in the ASPA proposal and this Comment, "real rate of return" signifies the amount by which the return on investment exceeds the rate of inflation. ASPA,
supra note 66, at 6.
AMERICAN SOC'Y OF PENSION ACTUARIES

69.
70.

Id.
Id.

71.
ERISA funding standards leave considerable latitude to a company to choose
among permissive funding methods. Actuaries have tended to err on the conservative side (that is, to require contributions on the high end rather than the
low end within the range of reasonable actuarial calculations).
PBGC ProposalHearing,supra note 12, at 250 (testimony of Peter M. Kelly, Chamber
of Commerce of the United States).
72. Id.; see also supra notes 52, 53 and accompanying text.
73. Both the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) place significant reductions on the maximum allowa-
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bine to contribute to plan overfunding.
D. General Plan Requirements to Take a Reversion
In order for a plan to qualify as a bona fide pension program permitting a reversion upon termination, the plan provisions must meet
the specific requirements of ERISA 4 and the IRC.7 5 The plan must
be permanent and be established for the exclusive benefit of
employees.
1.

The Requirement of Permanence

First, in order for a plan to be qualified, it must be permanentJ 6
The requirement of permanence does not abridge the plan sponsor's
right to terminate or amend the plan."7 However, if the plan is terminated "for other than business necessity within a few years after it
has taken effect," the plan may not be considered a bona fide retirement program.78 Thus, the requirement of permanence only affects
the decision to terminate a plan if it is determined that the plan was
never a bona fide retirement program.
2. Exclusive Benefit Requirement
Second, a plan must be established for the exclusive benefit of the
employees and their beneficiaries.79 However, under the IRC, an exception is made for cases in which the plan has satisfied all plan
liabilities to the employees and their beneficiaries.8 Likewise, a similar exception exists in ERISA, which allows reversions if: "(A) all
liabilities of the plan to participants and their beneficiaries have been
satisfied, (B) the distribution does not contravene any provision of
law, and (C) the plan provides for such a distribution in these circumstances."'" These exceptions to the exclusive benefit provisions
ble benefits under defined benefit plans (defined contribution allocation limits were also
reduced). At least in smaller plans, these reductions have a great impact on the funding
of defined benefit plans.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 401 (1986).
75. The IRC requires a plan to include certain provisions in order to qualify for
favorable tax treatment. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1986).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2 (1980); Rev. Rul. 69-25, 1969-1 C.B. 113.

77. Id.
78. Id.; Rev. Rul. 69-25, 1969-1 C.B. 113.
79. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1986); ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1)
(1982).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) (1986).

81. ERISA §4044(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1) (1982).
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form the basis for the reversion of excess assets. Thus, the exclusive
benefit rule applies while the plan is still in operation, but the exceptions provide a method for the employer to receive the excess assets
when the plan is terminated and all liabilities are paid.
3. The Plan Instrument Must Allow Reversions
However, the exceptions to the exclusive benefit rule alone are not
enough to allow a reversion of excess assets to the sponsoring employer after termination of the plan. Both ERISA and the IRC require a plan to be established and maintained according to a written
instrument.8 2 In addition, the plan document must expressly provide
for a reversion; 83 without such a provision, no reversion may take
place.84 The provision allowing for reversions need not be in the original plan instrument; provisions for the amendment of the plan document are outlined in ERISA and the IRC. 5

The federal courts have heard a number of cases seeking to limit
plan sponsors' rights to amend the plan document and provide for
reversions. These cases can be divided into three general groups.
First, courts have dealt with claims in which the original plan document provisions expressly denied the plan sponsor the right to amend
the plan to allow for reversions.86 Second, courts have ruled on
pretermination amendments made to allow for reversions.8 7 Third,
courts have ruled on post-termination attempts to authorize reversions to the plan sponsor.88
The federal courts have rejected an employer's claim for a reversion when the plan document specifically stated that no reversion
could go to the employer.8" However, a federal circuit court, in Wil82. See supra note 38.
83. International Union v. Dyneer Corp., 747 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1984) (plan
provision permitting excess assets to be returned to employer as a result of actuarial error
was sufficient to allow the reversion); Eager v. Savannah Foods & Indus., 605 F. Supp.
415 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (plan provision allowing for the return of excess assets satisfied
ERISA notwithstanding that the plan provisions were contradictory to the Summary
Plan Description); District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row Publishers, 574 F. Supp. 1468
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (express plan provision permitting the return of excess assets to the
employer held sufficient).
84. See Kruznski v. Richard Bros. Punch Co., 211 Pens. Rep. (BNA) D-8 (E.D.
Mich. 1978); see also 29 C.FR. § 2618.30(a)(1) (1988).
85. The plan must provide a procedure for the amendment of the plan. ERISA §
402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1982).
86. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
87. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
89. Bryant v. International Fruit Prod. Co., 793 F.2d 118 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 986 (1986) (provision in the plan prohibiting plan reversions could not be
amended to allow for reversions); see Rosenbaum v. Davis Iron Works, 699 F. Supp. 813
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (provision in the plan prohibiting plan reversions could not be

amended to allow for reversions); Unitus v. JFC Acquisition Co., 643 F. Supp. 454

(N.D. III. 1986) (amendment providing for a reversion to the employer precluded by a
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son v. Bluefield Supply Co.,90 held that a nondiversion clause in the

original plan document did not bar an amendment providing for a
reversion. 9' Additionally, a federal court, in Pollock v. Castrovinci,92
held a provision prohibiting a plan amendment that enabled the employer to recover funds in the trust as a result of a termination did
not apply to an amendment to allow a reversion. 93 As a general rule,
an express provision prohibiting the plan from allowing the return of
excess assets to the plan sponsor will be upheld; however, the provision language must be explicit. If the language is ambiguous, it is
likely that a revision amendment will be allowed.
Federal courts generally approve amendments of plans to allow for94
reversions if the amendment takes place prior to plan termination.
A federal court, in Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild Local

35 v. The Washington Star Co.,95 even upheld a plan amendment
made coincident with the plan termination. 96 However, federal
courts have not upheld amendments of plans to provide for reversions made after plan terminations became effective.97
Recent legislation adds a new twist to the rules regarding reversion amendments, and makes moot much of the prior case law in this
area. Under the Pension Protection Act of 1987 (PPA), 98 an amendment to an existing plan to provide for reversion of excess plan assets
(upon plan termination) does not become effective until five calendar
years from the date of amendment. 99 Therefore, a plan sponsor who
wishes to terminate a defined benefit plan, and who has no provision
providing for a reversion, is unable to take a reversion for at least
five years after amending the existing plan.' 0

collective bargaining agreement).
90. 819 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1987).
91. Id. at 462. The court distinguished Bryant on the grounds that the nonreversion provision was not included in the Bluefield plan.
92. 476 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. Id. (provision in the plan instrument prohibiting fund from returning to the
employer after a plan termination only applied to the case of an amendment to reduce
benefit).
94. In re C. D. Moyer Co. v. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa.), afT'd,
582 F.2d 1273 (3rd Cir. 1977); Pollock v. Castrovinci, 478 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), afjTd, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980).
95. 555 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1983).
96. Id. at 262.
97. Audio Fidelity Corp. v. PBGC, 624 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1980).
98. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330.
99. Pension Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9311(a)(1)(c), 101

Stat. 1330 (amending ERISA § 4044(d)), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1988)).
100. Id. The plan sponsor may still terminate the plan, however, no reversion may
take place. The excess assets would be distributed among the participants of the plan.
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Having examined the defined benefit plan (contrasting it with the
defined contribution plan), how a reversion occurs, and the plan requirements for taking reversions, it is now necessary to review the
complaints about reversions and the methods by which an employer
may take a reversion. Part II will discuss both.
II.
A.

ABUSING THE SYSTEM

Introduction: The Complaints

The outcry for change in the current law allowing reversions results from a number of perceived abuses of the system. These abusive practices are claimed to reduce participants' retirement security

by allowing termination of plans with employers taking reversions
which should go to the participants.' 0' When this happens, the participant is not able to enjoy the full benefit that was promised at
retirement. Additionally, it is urged, that excess assets reverting to
the plan sponsor should be distributed to plan participants as cost of
living increases. 0 2 Finally, there is the theory that plan sponsors
should make contributions to fund employees' benefits and not to

create windfalls for themselves. 103
The proponents of changing the system cite a number of different
techniques plan sponsors use to receive excess assets. 04 Among those
06
techniques are spinoff/termination,' 05 termination/replacement,
and simple termination with no succeeding plan.0 7 An additional irritant to these groups is that the sole purpose of these terminations is

to acquire the excess money.' 08 They argue the ease with which employers can access the excess assets makes it too simple for an employer to decide to terminate the plan and receive the reversion. 0 9

101. Stein, supra note 12, at 130; see also Comment, supra note 12, at 259.
102. Stein, supra note 12, at 130; Comment, supra note 12, at 259; see also Surplus Assets: Benefits for Whom?, PENS. & INVEST. AGE, Feb. 7, 1983, at 10.
103. See PBGC Proposal Hearing, supra note 12, at 293 (statement of Clayman,
J., Nat'l Council of Senior Citizens, claiming that pension plan assets are deferred wages
of the participants, thus, any excess should go to the participants); see also Comment,
Reversion of Surplus Pension Assets Upon Plan Termination: Is it Consistent with the
Purpose of ERISA?, 62 IND. L. REv. 805 (1987); Nobles, Who is Entitled to the Pension Fund Surplus?, 16 IND. L.J. (1987).
104. See infra notes 110-15, 133, 134, 154 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 133, 134 and accompanying text.
106. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
108. Hawthorne, Raiding the Corporate Pension Fund, The Institutional Investor,
in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PLAN TERMINATIONS, ASSET OR LIABILITY? 273 (1984).
109. There is no current requirement of business necessity to terminate a plan.
Thus, it is claimed the employer can terminate solely for the purpose of getting at the
excess funds. But see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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B.

Techniques of Receiving Reversions
1. Simple Terminations

The most straightforward way to receive a reversion from an
overfunded defined benefit pension plan is through a simple termination. 110 As with any termination, specific requirements must be met
by the employer when filing with the IRS and the PBGC."'1 Benefits
are calculated for each participant as of the termination date."x2 In
addition, all accrued benefits must vest 100% upon plan termination.'" After approval from the IRS and the PBGC, the plan must

distribute its benefits to the participants."4 After benefit distribu15
tion, the employer may take the remaining assets as a reversion.

There is no statutory limitation on the plan sponsor's decision to
terminate the plan."' Groups advocating changing the law (in regard to reversions) cite examples of plan sponsors terminating plans
110. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to address the requirements and procedures involved in terminating a defined benefit plan. This section will present a basic
overview of methods of plan terminations and their uses in receiving reversions. For more
information on the termination process, see ERISA §§ 4041-4048, 29 U.S.C. §§ 13411348 (1982 & Supp. 1988); see also 5 R.I.A. Pens. Coordinator 11 58,101 - 61,701
(1988).
111. See ERISA §§ 4041-4048, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1348 (1982 & Supp. 1988);
see also 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Plans §§ 906-952 (1988).
112. 29 C.F.R. § 2619.2 (1987). "Except as otherwise specifically provided, the
assets of a plan shall be valued for purposes of this part of the plan's termination date,
determined in accordance with section 4048 of the Act." 29 C.F.R. § 2620.4 (1987).
113. 26 U.S.C. § 411(d)(3) (1986).
114.

(D) Final distribution of assets in the absence of notice of noncompliance. The

plan administrator shall commence the final distribution of assets pursuant to
the standard termination of the plan as soon as practicable after the expiration
of the 60-day period [after filing the notice to terminate with the PBGC] ...
ERISA § 4041(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(D) (1982 & Supp. 1988).
115. It should be noted that the participant does not lose any current benefits
through the termination process. The participant receives her currently accrued benefit
which becomes 100% vested upon the termination. Thus, the participants are receiving
the benefits promised them in the plan document; however, they will not receive any
future accruals unless another plan is established. See PBGC ProposalHearings, supra
note 12, at 232 (statement of Richard H. Fay, for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States) ("employers exercising reversions are fulfilling their obligations since they
must ensure payment of promised benefits to all plan participants before they may take
back a single penny").
116. The plan sponsor does not need a reason for plan termination; however, she
may not voluntarily terminate the plan unless there are sufficient assets to meet benefit
liabilities under the plan. ERISA § 4042(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1) (1982 & Supp.
1988). However, if the plan is terminated within the first few years of its existence, it
may not be considered permanent. The result may be the disqualification of the plan's
tax preferred status. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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solely to obtain the excess funds."17 There is some basis for this argument, especially in light of the many recent examples of employers
terminating plans to avoid takeovers,"' after successful takeovers,1"9
and seemingly with. no apparent reason other than to capture the
excess funds.120 Recent legislative hearings indicate that in 1987
only 6.8 % of businesses terminating pension plans stated the termination was due to business necessity. 12 ' Additionally, it has been suggested that some employers may terminate their plans and take reversions because of uncertainty over the future of plan reversions
and fear that the opportunity may be legislated out of existence.' 22
It should be noted that the fiduciary standards 2 3 outlined in
ERISA do not apply to decisions to terminate plans.' The decision
to terminate is generally considered a nonfiduciary business decision. 125 Thus, the general requirement that plan" fiduciaries act in 12the
7
interest of participants and their beneficiaries ' does not apply.
Besides a plan sponsor terminating the plan for-no apparent reason other than to get at the reversion, it seems that the large dollar
figures involved are what really shocks many opponents of reversions.' 28 An excellent example is the termination of the United Airlines plan which resulted in a reversion of $962 milion. 29 Reports
indicate that between 1980 and 1988, approximately 1897 plans terminated, each with a reversion in excess of $1 million. 130 From these
117. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
118. See Stein, supra note 12, at 127; see also District 65, UAW v. Harper &
Row Publishers, 576 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (employer used excess pension assets to fend off an unfriendly takeover).
119. After a takeover, the overfunded pension plan may be terminated in order to
retire some of the takeover debt.
120. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
121. Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Bert Seidman).
122.
It is no accident that there has been an increased incidence of reversion activity

over the past two to three years. This increased termination activity corresponds with the time period during which we have heard serious proposals to
undermine the ability of employers to recover reversions in the event of plan
terminations.
See PBGC Proposal Hearing, supra note 12, at 249 (testimony of Peter M. Kelly,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
123. The fiduciary standards of ERISA are outlined in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114
(1982 & Supp. 1988).
124. District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row Publishers, 576 F. Supp. 1468
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
125. Id.
126. ERISA states "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.
ERISA § 404(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982).
127. See District 65, 576 F. Supp. at 1477-78.
128. See infra notes 129, 130 and accompanying text.
129. Stein, supra note 12, at 119 (citing 12 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 837 (June 17,
1985)).
130. Hearing on the Employee Pension Protection Act of 1989, S. 685 Before the
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plans, the total amount taken by employers is close to $20 billion
dollars.' 3 1 It shocks the conscience of many to see these large numbers. Even though the participants affected received their full earned
benefits, many are disturbed by the belief that employers terminated
these plans prematurely just to get at the huge excess.'

2

2. Spinoff/Termination

The technique for receiving excess assets referred to as spinoff/
termination is severely criticized. On one hand, critics claim this
method is not really a termination at all. 3 3 On the other, critics
maintain these terminations present potential funding problems for

the plan that continues to exist.'
This method of termination involves splitting a single defined benefit plan into two plans.' 35 One plan includes only retired' 36 participants; the other includes all current participants. The catch is that
the plan including all retirees also includes all the excess assets.' 37
As soon as the plans are spun apart, the plan with the retirees is

terminated and the plan sponsor takes the reversion. 38 The plan
with the current participants continues as before, but without the

benefit of the excess funds.' 39

Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Labor and Human Services, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Pension Protection Hearing 89] (data provided by the PBGC);
see also PBGC ProposalHearings, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Chairman Pickle);
Stein, supra note 12, at 119 (citing 13 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 351 (Feb. 24, 1986)). Note
that the total number of actual plan terminations is far greater than the 578 mentioned.
It is likely that these terminations represented the largest of the reversions taken in the
period 1980 through the date of publication.
131. See Pension Protection Hearing89, supra note 130. It should be recognized
that these figures do not represent those plans which terminated with a reversion of less
than one million dollars, nor are the potential reversions included for those terminations
which were pending under the Treasury Department moratorium since October 24, 1988.
132. See supra notes 103, 129-130 and accompanying text.
133. Comment, supra note 12, at 267.
134. Id. at 268.
135. See ASPA, supra note 66, at 5; Comment, supra note 12, at 267; Stein,
supra note 12, at 129; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., lST SESS., OVERVIEW
OF CURRENT ISSUES RELATING TO SINGLE-EMPLOYER DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS
PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTEE CORPORATION (PBGC) PREMIUMS 1, 32 (Comm.
Print 1987).
136. The retired participants are those participants who have qualified for retirement under the plan (either early or normal) and have ceased working for the employer.
They may also include benefits to terminated participants which have not yet been paid
out. See Stein, supra note 12, at 130.
AND

137.

Id.

138. Id.
139. This type of termination has been approved by the Treasury Department, the
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Opponents of this method of termination claim it is not a termination at all, but represents "form over substance."' 14 0 They claim the
plan sponsor accomplishes in two steps what it could not accomplish
in one. Namely, the sponsor is unable to take money from the trust
without its prior termination. This method of termination allows the
employer to get at the excess funds while still leaving intact a plan
for current participants. 4 '
Another claim against spinoff/termination is that the plan remaining after the spinoff may have future funding problems. 42 Since the
plan is spun off from the terminating plan with assets sufficient only
to meet current liabilities, a change in conditions may result in the
plan being underfunded in the future. 4 3 That is, after stripping the
plan of excess assets, the employer may not properly fund future
benefit accruals, thus possibly forcing participants to lose benefits. 4
In order to reduce some of the worry over spinoff/terminations,

the PBGC, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of
Labor issued joint guidelines addressing the reversion issue under
this termination method.' 4 5 These guidelines set out certain conditions as prerequisites for a valid spinoff/termination. 46 First, all
Department of Labor, and the PBGC. In a PBGC News Release of May 24, 1984, joint
guidelines were issued addressing the issues of spinoff/terminations, and of termination/
reestablishments. PBGC News Release 84-23 (May 23, 1984).
The federal courts have approved this method in Foster Medical Corp. Employees'
Pension Plan v. Healthco, Inc., 753 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1985); Bigger v. American Commercial Lines, 652 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Mo. 1986).
140. Comment, supra note 12, at 268.
141. Id.; see also Stein, supra note 12, at 130.
142. See supra note 134.
143. This result may occur if the plan sponsor uses a more liberal set of actuarial
assumptions or a funding method which will provide for lower annual contributions. Additionally, changes in the makeup of participants or future investment losses may also
contribute to the underfunding of the existing plan.
144. "The ongoing plan is not required to retain any assets above the level of the
plan's termination liability. The absence of any assets above this level may reduce employees' security with respect to future benefits and may also discourage employers from
providing future benefit increases." McNeil & Griffin, Rules on Reversions Reexamined,
13 J. PENS. PLAN. & CoMP. 291, 298 (1987).

145. PBGC News Release 84-23 (May 23, 1984).
146. In the case of a so-called "spinoff/termination," generally no termination will
be recognized and any attempt to recover excess assets will be treated as a diversion of
assets for a purpose other than the exclusive benefit of employees and beneficiaries unless
the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The benefits of all employees (including those covered by the ongoing plan)
must be fully vested and nonforfeitable as of the date of termination.
(2) All benefits accrued as of the date of termination in the ongoing plan must
be provided for by the purchase of annuity contracts which represent irrevocable commitments for the benefit of each individual participant.
(3) All employees who are covered by the original plan must be given advance
notice of the transaction in similar time and manner as if the entire original
plan were being terminated.
Id; see also McNeil & Griffin, supra note 144, at 298.
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benefits must be vested at the time of the termination. 47 Second, all
benefits accrued at the time of termination must be provided for by
the purchase of annuity contracts.' 48 Third, notice must be given to
the employees.' 49 Finally, the continuing plan must adopt a special
funding method. 50 The purpose of these guidelines is to secure for
participants the same benefit rights they would be entitled to if the
plan were to actually terminate. The funding requirements also attempt to avoid possible future underfunding of the continuing plan.
Congress has passed legislation dealing with the spinoff/termination.' 5 ' This legislation provides that plan assets must be proportionately distributed between the two plans.' 52 The method for such allocation is based on a proportion of the excess assets calculated
according to each plan's ratio of total accrued benefits.'5 3 This new
provision responds to both complaints about the spinoff type transaction. First, the plan sponsor cannot get at all the excess funds, making termination under this method less tempting. Second, even if the
spinoff method is employed, the remaining plan will have adequate
remaining assets to avoid future funding difficulties.
The joint guidelines coupled with recent legislation make spinoff/
termination much less desirable as a tool for receiving excess assets.
However, the result may be to force an employer to terminate the
plan altogether with participants being denied any future benefit accruals. This result is less than desirable.
3.

Termination/Reestablishment

This method of termination has several steps: first, the defined
benefit plan is terminated; second, the sponsor takes the reversion;
and third, a similar defined benefit plan or a defined contribution
147. PBGC News Release 84-23 (May 23, 1984).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. § 5(a), (b).
151. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102
Stat. 3702.
152. In the case of a plan spinoff of a defined benefit plan, a trust which forms part
of:
(i) the original plan, or

(ii) any plan spun off from such plan, shall not constitute a qualified trust
under this section unless the applicable percentages of excess assets are [sic]
allocated to each of such plans.
Id. § 2005(c) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 414() (1988)).
153. Id.
1127

plan is established.15 4 The same arguments raised against the spin-

off/termination method apply here as well. 55 First, this transaction
is "form over substance. 11 56 Second, there is great potential for underfunding the new plan. 57 These concerns are valid since the replacement plan often provides the same, or similar, benefits as the
terminated plan. 58 However, the potential for funding problems does
not exist if a defined contribution plan is established.
The joint guidelines issued by the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and the PBGC require termination/reestablishments to meet specific requirements. 5 9 The termination/reestablishment must meet specific funding requirements. 160 The
guidelines also permit the new plan to "grant past service credit for
the period in which the employee was covered by the terminated
plan."' 6 '
Complaints of abuse and the variety of techniques employed to

take reversions have lead to a frenzy of legislative activity. One irony
of this legislative activity is the current congressional focus on the
use of a modified form of termination/reestablishment to address the
reversion issue. Part III discusses the current legislative environment, focusing on recent modifications and pension policy.
III. THE CURRENT AND FUTURE LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT

A.

Legislative Frenzy

Congress has responded to calls for reform. In recent years, it has
passed a considerable amount of legislation regarding private retirement plans. 6 ' Included in this legislative frenzy are many provisions
154. McNeil & Griffin, supra note 144, at 297; see also Comment, supra note 12,
at 263.
155. See supra notes 133-34, 140-44 and accompanying text. Note that one frequently overlooked aspect of the spinoff/terminations, and of termination/reestablishment arrangements is that a plan continues to exist, or a new plan is established. This
spinoff or new plan provides additional benefit accruals for the participants.
156. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
158. Depending on the reestablished plan's method of funding, actuarial assumptions, and investment experience, there is some potential for plan underfunding especially
if the employer uses assumptions of a liberal (lower contributions) nature.
159. See supra note 145.
160. PBGC News Release 84-23, § 5(a), (b) (May 23, 1984).
161. Id. § 3 (this section also applies to spinoff/terminations). It should be noted,
however, that granting credit for past service is not required, only allowed. Id.
162. It has seemed like a never ending parade of legislation. Every year, Congress,
in the name of reform, or the like, has passed legislation making the private retirement
field more and more complicated. Arguably, most of this legislation is revenue related

and probably many of the recent changes in the law have resulted in many plan terminations. Included in the extensive list of major pension legislation since 1980 are: Economic

Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; Retirement Equity Act of

1128

[VOL. 26: 1109, 1989]

Legislating Reversions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

dealing with plan terminations, and, more specifically, with reversions. 16 3 Already noted is recent legislation affecting the excise tax
an employer must pay upon receiving a reversion,"" a five year waiting period regarding the effectiveness of plan reversion amendments, 6 5 and a provision providing for pro rata allocation of excess
assets in a spinoff/termination. 66 As will be seen, there have been a
number of failed attempts to prohibit or severely restrict reversions.

However, judging from the increased congressional interest in the
reversion issue, more reversion legislation may be forthcoming. 6 7

1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 97 Stat. 1426; Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; and many miscellaneous technical correction bills.

It is arguable that if the Congress continues to play legislative games within the private retirement field, sponsors will be less likely to continue to operate plans, and thus
the future private retirement benefits for millions of employees will be injured.
It would be productive for Congress to discontinue the ad hoe changing of the system
in the name of revenue or stopping abuse, and once and for all, to decide on a national
legislative policy for the private retirement system. Congress must decide if it really
means what it says-that the government cannot pull the retirement burden by itself
through social security and other entitlement programs. If this is not mere rhetoric, why
continue to reduce incentives for retirement savings (both personal and through employer
sponsored plans), instead of supporting the system and advancing its growth?

163. See supra note 100 (five year amendment provision); supra note 152 (requiring proportional allocation of assets in a spinoff/termination); infra note 164 (excise tax

reversions).
164. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, added
section 4980 to the tax code. This section provided for a 10% excise tax on reversions
from defined benefit pension plans. Under the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3702, this provision was amended to increase the
excise tax to 15 %. For a discussion of section 4980 (prior to the Technical Corrections
Act), see Kladder, Asset Reversion Under the Tax Reform Act: A Review of Code Section 4980, 13 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMP. 5 (1987).
165. Revenue Act and Pension Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L, No. 100-203, §
9311, 100 Stat. 1330. This provision amended ERISA § 4044(d) (29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)
(1988)).
166. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
167. The changes indicated above are no more than an effort to close loopholes or
remedy perceived abuses. There is no indication that Congress will discontinue its interest in further legislating the pension area. Indeed, the need to find new revenues may be
reason enough for Congress to keep a sharp eye on the pension arena as a potential
source for deficit reducing legislation. A recent example of revenue driven "reform" is
the amendment of the Internal Revenue Code section 133 deduction for leveraged Employer Stock Ownership Plan loans. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.

101-239, §§ 7301-7304, 103 Stat. 2106.
1129

B.

Technical Corrections '88

The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988168 in-

creases the excise tax on the reversion of excess plan assets.169 This
final provision replaced a Senate bill allowing for a temporary increase in the excise tax to sixty percent. 7 0 The sixty percent provision itself replaced a bill imposing a temporary moratorium on reversions. 171 Other legislative proposals, not included in the technical
corrections bill but likely to resurface, are provisions for sharing of
the plan sponsor, and the
excess assets between participants 1and
2
elimination of reversions altogether.
C.

The Employee Pension Protection Act of 1989

It did not take the 101st Congress long to follow up on previous
failures to limit reversions. On April 4, 1989, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D. Ohio) introduced legislation designated S. 685171 and
Representative Bill Clay (D. Mo.) introduced H.R. 1661; 174 both
bills were designed to severely restrict reversions.17 5 S. 685, typical
of the restrictive bills, had three purposes:
First, to protect workers' fair share of the money set aside for retirement.
Second, to encourage employers who terminate plans to set up new plans, as
generous as their former ones. Finally, by fairly protecting workers' pen-

sions, to reduce the incentive to use pension assets to finance a merger or
takeover. 76

The approach here is similar to termination/reestablishment. In ei168. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102
Stat. 3702; see supra text accompanying note 151.
169. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 6069, 102 Stat. 3702 (amending I.R.C. § 4980(a)); see supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. The excise tax bill reads as follows: "(1) In General - In the case of any
employer reversion from a qualified plan received after July 26, 1988, and before May 1,
1989, section 4980(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 shall be applied by substituting '60 percent' for '10 percent.'" S. 2338, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 799(a)(1) (1988);
134 CONG. REC. S12,364 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1988).
Although worded as an excise tax, the practical effect of such a provision would be to
place a moratorium on reversions. It is highly unlikely that an employer would wish to
pay the 60% tax.
171. The moratorium bill, S. 2284, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (introduced by
Sen. Metzenbaum) would have made it a violation of the fiduciary provisions of ERISA
for excess assets to revert back to the employer. Employee Benefits Policy Association,
Inc., Fact Sheet (Aug. 18, 1988).
172. See supra note 21 (Senator Metzenbaum indicates intent to introduce further
revision legislation); see infra notes 173-81 (discussion of S. 685 and H.R. 1661).
173. S. 685, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
174. H.R. 1661, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
175. See Nickerson, Metzenbaum and Clay Introduce Bills to Restrict Pension
Reversions, ENROLLED ACTUARIES REP., June 1989, at 1.
176. Pension Protection Hearing 89, supra note 130 (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum).
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ther case, the amount of the reversion is dependent on the similarity
of the new plan established by the employer with the terminated
plan. In general, the bill provided that upon termination of the plan,
if the employer adopted an identical plan, the new plan must retain
a 125 % cushion beyond projected plan liabilities and provide for a
one-time increase to retirees. After meeting these two requirements,
the employer may take any excess as a reversion.' 7 Of course, since
a plan termination is involved, all benefits must become 100%
vested.
If an employer adopts a subsequent plan, but not an identical
plan, any reversion that may be taken would depend on whether the
new plan 17 8 is considered a substantial replacement plan, or a sham
plan (a sham plan includes the situation in which no substitute plan
is adopted).
If only a substantial replacement plan is established,
the asset cushion is increased to 135%. The rationale behind the
increased cushion is to protect against future market downturn and
to compensate participants for additional loss of retirement benefits
caused by the employer's failure to adopt an identical plan. The substantial replacement plan must also give retirees a one-time increase
in benefits. Only after all these requirements are met may the employer take any remaining assets as a reversion. 8
If the employer adopts a sham plan or no subsequent plan at all,
the bill would require allocation of the 135 % cushion to active participants, a one-time increase in retirees' benefits, and then, pro rata
allocation of any remaining assets to active participants.' 8'
Both the Senate and House versions of the reversion legislation
died in the budget reconciliation process. However, with much of the
preliminary work completed, and with the possibility that Congress
will have more time on its hands next session, it is very likely that
this same reversion legislation will be introduced. Its passage is a
good possibility.

177. See 135 CONG. REc. S3,235 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989) (statements of Sen.
Metzenbaum and text of S. 685); see also Pension Protection Hearing 89, supra note
130.
178. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
179. It is somewhat odd that an employer's voluntary adoption of a substitute plan
would be considered a sham. If benefits are actually provided, this new plan is obviously
real and beneficial.
180. See 135 CONG. REC. S3,236 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); see also Pension Protection Hearing 89, supra note 130 (statement of Sen.
Metzenbaum).
181. See 135 CONG. REC. S3,235-38 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1989).
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D. It is Time for a Pension Policy
In light of the recent legislative changes and the voluminous transcripts from congressional hearings and studies, legislators should
take additional time to consider the effects of current and proposed
modifications and carefully weigh the pros and cons of any additional reversion related legislation. Further ad hoc legislation can
only damage the pension system. Congress must design a cohesive
and comprehensive policy regarding all future legislation in this
area. 182 This policy should follow the general outlines established in
ERISA, with such modifications as are necessary based on experience since ERISA's adoption. The policy should look not only to promoting the health of the system, but also to the interests of plan
participants and sponsoring employers. Once established, Congress
must use its legislative powers only in furtherance of the unified policy, practicing what it preaches, by protecting the benefit security
interests of plan participants and encouraging employers to establish
and responsibly fund defined benefit plans. In this way, the private
pension system will continue to thrive. Continued congressional ad
hoc legislation will eventually spell the death of the defined benefit
system and strike a serious blow to the retirement security of millions of workers.

While reviewing the results of its recent legislation and contemplating a national pension policy, Congress must consider the drastic
consequences of further reversion legislation on the private pension
system. Such consequences are analyzed in Part IV.
IV,

ANALYSIS OF WHY CURRENT LEGISLATIVE DIRECTION
SHOULD BE CHANGED

During this time of reflection, Congress should think twice about a
legislative direction which would change the current plan reversion
system. Elimination or severe restriction of reversions is both mistaken and illogical. Before making any drastic changes regarding reversions, Congress must first look at the effects of such legislation
upon the group it seeks to protect, the plan participants. 183 The par182. Congress has failed to establish such a policy. It can be argued that the current legislative direction in Congress, toward further pension legislation, flies directly in
the face of ERISA policy by taking away the incentives necessary for employers to adopt

retirement plans. See infra notes 204-13 and accompanying text (reversion legislation
violates the ERISA policy of promoting adequate funding).
Additionally, any policy should consider the positions taken by the governmental agen-

cies overseeing the pension area. The PBGC, Department of Labor, and IRS all agree
that reversion legislation would do more harm than good. Congress should listen carefully to these opinions since Congress placed those agencies in charge of overseeing the

system.
183.

Any legislation which would do away with reversions must be based on the

rationale of further protecting participants' benefit security.
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ticipants are the ultimate losers if there is any drastic modification of
the current system. First, legislation limiting revisions will likely
cause future defined benefit plans to be underfunded. Second, underfunding will likely increase the deficit of the PBGC. Both of these
results adversely affect the benefit security of plan participants.
In addition to the participants' interests, Congress must consider

the effects of legislation on the private pension system, specifically as
it relates to defined benefit plans. Reversion legislation will have
drastic effects on the current system. First, such legislation would
destroy the nature of defined benefit pension plans. Second, reversion
legislation flies in the face of important ERISA policies. Third, reversion legislation punishes many for the alleged abuses of a few.""
A.

Underfunding will be the Likely Result

Defined benefit plan underfunding is a likely result of legislation
eliminating or modifying plan sponsors' options 1 85 to revert excess
assets.'
Employers who adopt a plan to pay participants an expressly stated benefit at retirement may be unwilling to use a funding method and actuarial assumptions that result in excess funding.
This is because a sponsoring employer adopts a plan to fund a specific benefit at retirement, not whatever benefit may be available depending on the trust's investment return.18 7 Additionally, since the
employer bears the risk of investment losses, participants get the best
of both worlds: a guaranteed benefit based on the plan formula plus
184. The following analysis applies equally to legislation which would totally eliminate an employer's option to revert excess funds, as well as the "sharing" approach which
S. 685 shows is now in vogue.
185. Even with a valid provision in the plan document, the plan sponsor may decide not to take a reversion and to allocate excess assets among the participants. This is
especially true with smaller plans when the plan sponsor is also a plan participant and
wishes to distribute the excess to increase her own benefits as well as the other participants' benefits. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (plan requirements for

taking reversions).
186. PBGC ProposalHearing,supra note 12, at 250 (testimony of Peter M. Kelly,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States) ("To the extent that reversions are restricted. .. the result will unquestionably be less generous funding to the detriment of
plan participants."); see also ASPA, supra note 66.

187. Indeed, the whole defined benefit system is designed to provide a "definitely
determinable benefit." This benefit is expressly stated in the plan document, is calculated
through involved specific accrual and vesting provisions, is to be paid on a determinable
date, and is funded in such a way as to create enough money in the trust to pay the exact
benefit at normal retirement. Forcing the plan sponsor to give up any excess changes this
rigid system of benefits. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text; see also Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 36-39 (statement of David M. Walker, CPA, Assistant
Sect'y for Pension and Welfare Benefits, U.S. Dep't of Labor).
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a bonus if the employer funds the plan well. This is beyond the benefit promise the employer originally made. 188 Thus, a change in the
law eliminating reversions is likely to force plan sponsors to use
funding techniques which are less likely to create an excess. These
assumptions, combined with a downturn in a trust's investment return, may lead to underfunding. 189
Additionally, underfunded plans hurt plan participants. Even
though the participants' benefits may be guaranteed by the
PBGC, 90 this guarantee does not cover all plan benefits.19 ' In addition, not all defined benefit plans are covered by the PBGC.

92

Fur-

thermore, the PBGC guaranteed benefits are capped at a specific
monthly amount, 93 and the PBGC only guarantees those benefits
which were nonforfeitable prior to the plan's termination.' Thus, if
the PBGC steps in, plan participants may lose
valuable benefits they
95
would have realized in a well-funded plan.1
B. Increasing the PBGC Deficit
The PBGC now has a four billion dollar deficit caused by obligations to underfunded plans.' 96 If future defined benefit plans are un188.

See PBGC ProposalHearing,supra note 12, at 249 (testimony of Peter M.

Kelly, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) ("Employers will simply not commit
themselves to a one-sided deal in which the rules are 'heads we win and tails you
lose.' ").

189. Just as overfunding can occur through the use of conservative actuarial assumptions or better than anticipated investment experience, the use of liberal assumptions or a downturn in investment performance may cause the opposite result.
190. The benefit guarantees by the PBGC insurance program are listed in ERISA
§ 4022, 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
191. Generally, only benefits that were nonforfeitable prior to plan termination are
guaranteed by the PBGC. ERISA § 4022(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a), (b) (1982 &
Supp. 1988). The maximum guaranteed monthly benefit for 1989 was $2,028.41.
192. Plans which are not covered by the PBGC include: (1) individual account
plans (defined contribution plans); (2) government plans or plans established under the
Railroad Retirements Act of 1935 or 1937; (3) church plans; (4) a plan which is established solely for substantial owners as defined in ERISA § 4022(b)(6); and (5) plans
established by a professional service employer and which plan does not have more than
25 participants. See ERISA § 4021(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1320(b) (1982).
193.

See supra note 191.

194. A defined benefit plan must vest all benefits 100% at plan termination; however; the PBGC's guarantees only cover those benefits that were vested prior to termination. ERISA § 4022(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1982).
195.

The participant could lose the difference between the vested benefit prior to

plan termination (covered by the PBGC up to the annual maximum) and the fully vested

benefit the participant would receive under a well-funded plan.

For example, a participant whose monthly benefit before plan termination was $100
per month and who was 50% vested, would receive a maximum of $50 per month if the
PBGC had to pay under its guarantees. A well-funded plan would pay the participant
the fully vested benefit of $100 per month (of course, a partially underfunded plan may
pay the participant a benefit somewhere between the PBGC benefit and the well-funded
benefit).
196. Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 64 (testimony of Kathleen P. Utgoff, Execu1134

[VOL. 26: 1109, 1989]

Legislating Reversions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

derfunded, this deficit will rise substantially. Even more damaging is
the prospect that employers, scared away by the change in the reversion laws, will be reluctant to adopt defined benefit plans.197 The result of underfunded and fewer defined benefit plans is a decrease in
the benefit premiums received by the PBGC. 198 In turn, this will reduce the PBGC's ability to depend on premium payments of wellfunded plans as a means of keeping the system afloat. 9' This loss in
revenue will result in an even greater deficit.200 The potential finale
of this scenario is, without a government bailout, the collapse of the
PBGC insurance program.20

In the end, the participant loses when the PBGC deficit increases.
The very basis of the PBGC guarantee is on the line; if the PBGC

goes belly up, participants' benefits go with it.2 02 The potential for

this occurring has already been seen to be real.20 3 To forestall such a
possibility, premiums for PBGC coverage have increased twice in the
tive Director, PBGC).
197. Id. at 66 (testimony of Kathleen P. Utgoff, Executive Director, PBGC) ("To
do so would discourage responsible employers from establishing and maintaining the pension plans that provide the best retirement security."). A recent report indicated that the
number of defined benefit plans currently in existence has dropped. See 16 Pens. Rep.
(BNA) 2018 (Dec. 11, 1989) (outlining the results of the 1989 Hay/Huggins Benefit
Report). The constantly changing rules covering the defined benefit plan may have much
to do with this decline. Reversion legislation will increase the decline in defined benefit
plans.
198. Subcommittee, supra note 1, at 66 (statement of Kathleen P. Utgoff, Executive Director, PBGC) ("Any changes in the law to require sponsors to share reversions
with participants could create the wrong funding incentives which could further threaten
PBGC's financial security.").
199. PBGC Proposal Hearing, supra note 12, at 6 (statement of Kathleen P.
Utgoff, Executive Director, PBGC).
200. Id. at 7 ("At some point, the responsible companies may decide that their
premium dollars can be used better elsewhere. They may replace their defined benefit
pension plans with other arrangements. When companies with well funded plans leave
the program, the premium burden will rest on fewer and fewer shoulders ..
").
201. Id. Congress would be forced to inject new strength into the system since the
recent method of attempting to bolster the sagging revenues of the PBGC, premium
increases, would result in premiums so enormously high that they drive away potential
sponsors.
202. A prime example of the great value and necessity of the PBGC is the case of
the LTV termination. LTV terminated its plan which was grossly underfunded. The
PBGC stepped in and covered the benefits guaranteed under the program (doubling its
deficit). Without this insurance, thousands of participants' benefits would have been
practically worthless. Thus, the system does work to protect participants' benefits, but
only to the extent that it can stay financially healthy. If the pension termination system
ceased to exist, millions of participants would have to rely solely on the adequacy of the
sponsor's funding efforts for benefit security.
203. PBGC Proposal Hearing,supra note 12, at 5-10 (statement of Kathleen P.
Utgoff, Executive Director, PBGC); see supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
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last few years.204 In addition, a variable rate premium system has
been implemented for high risk plans.205 However, the PBGC is in
no way out of danger. The deficit continues, and the revenue base is
still dependent upon well-funded plans. 0 6 It is feared that another
round of premium increases will turn employers away from defined
benefit plans due to prohibitive premium payments. 0 7 Concern is
also voiced over any measure that would cause large numbers of
plans to terminate.20 8 Large numbers of terminations, as with premium increases, reduce the number of plans contributing to the system, thus reducing revenue. An increase in the number of underfunded plans could thus place great stress on the benefit
insurance system, potentially causing its collapse. The collapse of the
PBGC insurance system would be a huge blow to the retirement
benefit security of millions of plan participants. The potential combination of widespread plan underfunding and a collapse of the PBGC
system would wreak havoc in the pension community, turning the
clock back to pre-ERISA days.200
C. Defined Benefit Plans Destroyed
Legislation eliminating reversions destroys the essential nature of

a defined benefit plan. Benefits in the plan must be definitely determinable. 210 That is, at any time, a participant's benefits can be accurately calculated.21 ' With reversion legislation, this requirement
would be changed, and participants may have a claim to excess plan
assets. Therefore, their benefits would not be based on the express
language of the plan document, but on the value of the plan assets
(similar to a defined contribution plan).212 This raises many ques204. The Pension Protection Act (PPA) increased the PBGC premium from $8.50
per participant to $16 per participant. Pension Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100203, 101 Stat. 1330 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)). The $8.50 premium resulted from an increase for plan years beginning after December 31, 1985 by the Single
Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 11005, 100
Stat. 237 (1985) [hereinafter SEPPA], increasing the premium from $2.60 per
participant.
205. PPA, § 9331(b), (c), (d), (e) (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 1306(a)(3), 1307,
1305, 1306(c)(1)(A) (1982)).
206. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
208. See PBGC ProposalHearing, supra note 12, at 15.
209. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4639, 4645; S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4890, 4892.
210. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
211. The essence of the definitely determinable benefit requirement is the ability to
accurately calculate a participant's benefits at any time.
212. Indeed, the participant would have a benefit under the plan according to the
plan document, but would also have a claim to the excess portion of plan assets. It is true
that many employers allocate the excess assets after a termination to the participants.
However, this is a voluntary action by the employer, not a mandatory one as it would be
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tions. How is the plan to be administered? Does an individual participant who terminates employment receive a share of the excess?
How is this excess to be distributed? Why would an employer adopt
such a plan? Indeed, these questions and many others go to the heart
of the defined benefit system.
It makes no sense to adopt legislation which would change the
nature of the defined benefit plan. The current system has operated
in the same basic manner for years. Benefits are expressly outlined
and funded in accordance with accepted methods. The fact that
plans are overfunded proves that this type of plan does provide the
benefits that it promises. That many plans are overfunded proves
that employers are keeping their promises. It is no wonder the defined benefit plan is the most popular form of pension plan today.213
However, with reversion legislation, the system changes. A system
that has operated so well over time has the potential to become a
system that is inefficient and risky. Employers will lose the incentives
to properly fund their benefit promises (participants' benefits), will
become dependent not only on the benefit expressly provided for in
the plan but also on the performance of the trust, and will be placed
at risk when a plan turns out to be underfunded.
D. ERISA Policy out the Window

ERISA strongly supports a policy of adequate funding of defined
benefit plans.214 This policy is seen in the ERISA policy statement, 21 5 the conference committee report, 216 and implicitly in its esunder a revised system. Under this type of system, the employer would probably adopt a
defined contribution plan, or no plan at all.
213. PBGC Proposal Hearing, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Chairman
Pickle).
214. See supra note 209 and accompanying text; infra notes 215, 216 and accompanying text.
215.
[T]hat despite the enormous growth of such plans many employees with long
years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits... owing to the
inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans
with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered;
that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated
benefits; and it is therefore desirable... that minimum standards be provided
assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982) (Congressional findings and Declaration of
policy).
216. H.R. REP. No. 93-522, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4640, 4652; H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 23,
75, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4690; S. REP. No. 93-
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tablished funding standards.2 1 A policy of adequate funding is also
seen in ERISA provisions allowing an employer to take excess plan
assets upon plan termination. 1 8 Indeed, ERISA sought to avoid
many of the troublesome problems and abuses of the past by insur-

ing that the participants' benefits would be well funded. 219 Moreover,

this policy has worked! The vast majority of retirement plans are
well funded; well funded in many cases means overfunded. 220 The

framers of ERISA understood this; they incorporated reversion provisions that had existed since 1938221 because a policy which favors
adequate funding necessarily recognizes overfunding. 22 This protects
participants' benefits. Upon termination, the participant must get
100% of
his earned benefit; a well-funded plan supports this
22 3
policy.

E.

Punishing the Many

The PBGC program covers over 110,000 plans.2 24 Since 1980,
1897 plans have terminated with total reversions of around $20 billion. 2 5 At first blush, this appears to be an enormous amount of
money. However, in terms of the total trust values for all defined
benefit pension plans, some $1 trillion,2 26 this number is quite small.
Add to this the percentage of total plans which have terminated, and
383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

4890-92.
217. See ERISA §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
These provisions establish specific minimum standards that must be met in a defined
benefit plan to assure proper funding.
218. See PBGC Proposal Hearing,supra note 12, at 246-49 (testimony of Peter
M. Kelly, Chamber of Commerce of the United States). Mr. Kelly traces the history of
reversions from their origins in 1938 through ERISA and up to the present. He also
indicates that there is a national policy furthered by allowing reversions.
219. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
220. See PBGC ProposalHearing, supra note 12, at 250 (testimony of Peter M.
Kelly, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) ("Actuarial science is an imprecise
science. It is unlikely that an employer's contributions when combined with fund experience will actually hit the precise funding target. This is particularly the case when a plan
terminates.").
221. See PBGC Proposal Hearing,supra note 12, at 247 (testimony of Peter M.
Kelly, Chamber of Commerce of the United States). The conference committee also understood that a voluntary system needs incentives to induce potential plan sponsors to
adopt defined benefit plans. See supra note 209.
222. See supra note 220. Since actuarial science is imprecise, erring on the side of
overfunding protects the benefit security of plan participants.
223. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.

224. See PBGC ProposalHearing, supra note 12, at 5 (statement of Kathleen P.
Utgoff, Executive Director, PBGC).
225. Pension Protection Hearing 89, supra note 130 (the figures provided by the
PBGC and the Department of the Treasury also indicate that 600 or so plans with terminations in excess of one million dollars were held up pursuant to the Treasury moratorium on determination letters).
226. Id. "[T]hese pension plans [defined benefit plans] have accumulated assets of
nearly one trillion dollars, a sum which exceeds our national budget."
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it becomes clear that the reversion figure represents a small minority
of plans covering a minority of plan participants. 22 7 Additionally,
statistics show that the number of plans terminating and taking reversions is down from prior years. 228
Legislation eliminating reversions would affect the vast majority of
plans. Why should Congress punish the many for the actions of the
few? The answer is simply, they should not. Legislation should focus
on abuses and their correction, not on punishing sponsors who have
not terminated their plans and who have adequately funded their
plans.
Besides punishing the many employers who have not terminated

their plans and taken reversions, why should plan sponsors be punished for prudent investment of the trust fund?22 A high rate of
return for plan assets supports a policy of adequate funding. Yet,
legislation disallowing reversions punishes the plan sponsor for properly funding the participants' benefits through large investment returns.2 3 0 This result seems ludicrous if legislative policy is to benefit
plan participants.
Having analyzed the drastic consequences of reversion legislation,
it is evident that any modifications to the current system must be
designed to preserve the status quo. Any proposal for change must
take into account the interests of the participants, employers,
ERISA policy, and the defined benefit system. Part V reviews prior
proposals and presents a more workable solution.

227. The PBGC program alone covers over 30 million participants. PBGC Proposal Hearing,supra note 12, at 5 (statement of Kathleen P. Utgoff, Executive Director,
PBGC).
228. Pension Protection Hearing 89, supra note 130. Statistics provided in the
hearing present the following facts: In the period of 1980 through 1982, 126 plans terminated with reversions in excess of one million dollars; from 1983 through 1985, 1077
plans terminated; and from 1986 through 1988, 694 plans terminated. Id.; see also Subcommittee, supra note 1 (testimony of Kathleen P. Utgoff, Executive Director, PBGC)
("From 1985 through 1987 there were about 28,000 plan terminations. Only four percent tl,100) of these 28,000 terminations involved reversions in excess of one million

dollars. We have seen a substantial decline in the number of assets reversions, from a
high of 584 in 1985 to 251 in 1987."); PBGC Proposal Hearing,supra note 12, at 233
(statement of Richard H. Fay, Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
229. PBGC Proposal Hearing,supra note 12, at 233 (statement of Richard H.
Fay, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) ("Ironically, restrictions on reversions

actually penalize those employers who have kept their pension promise by responsibly
funding their plans.").
230. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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V.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE THAT PROTECT THE PARTICIPANT
AND THE SYSTEM

Since the point of any legislation addressing the issue of reversions
must be to benefit participants and to keep the defined benefit system healthy, doing away with reversions is not the answer. Instead,
Congress should focus on avoiding the need to terminate plans in the
first place. It is the plan termination which allows the reversion and,
more importantly, the potential loss of participant benefit security.2 31
Thus, by avoiding or decreasing terminations, participants' benefits
will continue to grow and the defined benefit system will continue to
flourish.
A.

Avoiding Termination

A primary concern about legislation making plan terminations
more difficult is fear of the same problems inherent in reversion legislation. 3 The overfunded plan still exists. Giving the participant
some of the excess is not the answer either, since this solution will

provide the wrong funding incentives to current plans and discourage
the adoption of new plans. It must be recalled that the employer, in
adopting a defined benefit plan, promises to pay a specific benefit to
the participant, not to pay a congressionally mandated benefit increase if the employer succeeds in overfunding the plan. In order to
avoid these pitfalls, it seems logical that a proposal allowing the plan
sponsor to withdraw a portion of the excess funds without terminating the plan is desirable.
B. Prior Proposals
This type of proposal is not entirely new. The Reagan Administration submitted a proposal with this feature in 1987.233 Likewise, the
American Society of Pension Actuaries (ASPA) 2 4 submitted a similar proposal for dealing with the plan termination problem. 3 5 Both
231. As long as the plan stays in effect, the participant continues to accrue benefits. Upon termination of the plan, the participant's benefit accrual ceases. Thus, in order
to protect participant benefits, the ideal solution is to promote the continuance of the
plan. This means giving the sponsor incentives not to terminate the plan. Avoiding termination is the best solution to the problem; all parties can be satisfied by a carefully
drafted solution.
232. Legislation making the termination of plans more difficult may be as detrimental as reversion legislation. The likely results of either legislation would be similar:
plan underfunding, fewer defined benefit plans, and potential PBGC difficulties. See
supra notes 185-230.
233. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TRADE, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY ACT OF 1987. H.R. Doc No. 33, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 478 (1987) [hereinafter ADMIN. PROPOSAL].

234. See supra note 67.

235. ASPA, supra note 66, at 9.
1140

Legislating Reversions

[VOL. 26: 1109, 1989]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of these proposals attempt to avoid plan terminations, thus protecting participants' future benefits by keeping plans alive. 23 6
The proposals allow the employer to withdraw a portion of the
excess assets from the trust without terminating the plan.237 It seems

likely that an amendment would be necessary to the exclusive benefit
rule to allow this withdrawal. 238 Both proposals limit the amount of
the withdrawal by placing a cushion between the accrued benefits of
the participants and the amount of funds which remain after withdrawal.239 Other provisions provide safeguards for adequate funding
after withdrawal,240 frequency of withdrawals,241 taxation of withdrawals, 242 and subsequent termination of the plan.2 43 Thus, both the
Administration and ASPA proposals provide a basis for participant
benefit security and a healthy defined benefit plan industry by allowing the employer to access a portion of the excess assets while
keeping the plan intact.
C. A Better Proposal

While the Reagan Administration's and ASPA's proposals are
sensitive to the participants' needs, they do not deal with all issues
important to participants. First, the proposal should include at least
a twenty percent cushion between the participants' accrued benefits
and the amount the employer may withdraw.244 This is necessary to
insure adequate future funding and to insure that a drop in the
trust's investment return will not place the plan in serious funding
difficulty.245
236.

ADMIN. PROPOSAL,

supra note 233, at 479 ("[t]he proposal permits employers

to withdraw assets from ongoing defined benefit pension plans"); ASPA, supra note 66,
at 10.
237. ADMIN. PROPOSAL, supra note 233, at 479; ASPA, supra note 66, at 10.
238. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. This modification would have
to provide for limited withdrawal as an additional exception to the exclusive benefit rule.

239.

ADMIN. PROPOSAL,

supra note 233, at 485; ASPA, supra note 66, at 10.

240. ASPA, supra note 66, at 12-14.
241. ADMIN. PROPOSAL, supra note 233, at 486.
242. Id. at 487.
243. Id. at 485.
244. The 20% cushion between the participant's accrued benefits and the total
trust assets would help to insure that the plan would not become underfunded due to the
use of more liberal funding assumptions or because of a downturn in trust investment
return. One of the goals of this proposal is to keep the plan intact while also continuing
to promote responsible funding of defined benefit plans. The 20% cushion helps promote
that end.
245. See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text. Without the asset cushion,
the same complaints could be lodged against the plan as were made regarding spinoff/
terminations and termination/reestablishments. It must be noted that this asset cushion
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Second, consideration should be given to fully vesting the participants' benefits upon employer withdrawal of excess assets.24 Employers should not be able to withdraw excess funds without providing participants with some additional benefit security triggered by
the withdrawal.247
Third, as suggested in the Reagan Administration's proposal, 48
limits should be placed on how often the employer may withdraw
excess funds from the plan. The purpose of this proposal is not to
create, for the employer, a new method to receive excess pension

funds as they continue to build in the trust. Thus, the sponsor must
be limited in the frequency of withdrawal.
Fourth, the excise tax on these withdrawals should be reduced, or
eliminated. The present excise tax on reversions 249 was implemented
to deter the withdrawal of excess assets along with reducing the taxadvantaged gain (i.e., tax free accumulation of assets) in the assets
while in the trust.2 50 While these same rationales continue to exist
for the taxing of reversions, the increased security of participants

and of the pension system is reason enough to reduce this tax to, at
most, the old ten percent level. 25'
Finally, modifications to ERISA and IRC provisions addressing
plan terminations are required in order to address the needs of those

plan sponsors who do need to terminate their plans. A system which
allows a plan sponsor to withdraw excess assets without termination
of the plan must still provide for those instances in which complete
termination is needed. Consideration should be given to creating
some type of business necessity test for complete plan terminations.
Under this test, the IRS, PBGC, or both, would be required to reis to facilitate continued adequate funding, not to provide the participants with additional
benefits.
246. Neither the Administration Proposal nor the ASPA proposal provide the participant with full vesting upon asset withdrawal. However, full vesting of participants'
benefits should be a requirement of any program which will allow the employer to withdraw assets from an ongoing plan.
247. Mandating 100% vesting for all participants in the event of a withdrawal
would place the participants in the same position they would have been in if the plan was
terminated, spun off, or replaced. See supra notes 113, 146.
248. Admin. Proposal, supra note 233, at 486.
249. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
250. Kladder, supra note 153, at 7. See also PBGC ProposalHearings,supra note
12, at 392 (testimony of The American Society of Pension Actuaries) ("The rationale
underlying the 10% [amended to 15%] excise tax is that it appropriately reverses the
tax expenditure of sheltering investment return.").
251. The repeal of the excise tax would be preferable; however, it is unrealistic in
light of the current desire in Congress to find revenue. See 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 157
(Jan. 15, 1990) (statement of a Senate Finance Committee aide who indicated that pensions are the place to raise revenues); see also 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 2119 (Dec. 18,
1989) (discussing a recent GAO report that indicates that the 15% excise tax of reversions is not sufficient to recapture the portion of the reversion that resulted from
favorable tax treatment).
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view the sponsor's request for termination with an eye toward the
sponsor's business.
Although not perfect, this proposal makes all concerned better off.
Most importantly, participants' benefits remain secure by keeping
the plans in operation. The cushion between the accrued benefit and
the remaining assets provides some assurances of adequate future
funding, thus promoting an important ERISA policy. The defined
benefit system itself is secured by keeping plans in existence and by
no major alterations being made to the current system. Additionally,
the PBGC becomes healthy and secure through an adequate revenue
base and well-funded plans. Finally, the plan sponsor is content since
a portion of the excess assets may be withdrawn from the plan to
meet whatever needs the sponsor sees fit. Thus, this proposal allows
all sides to reap some benefits without the drastic downsides that
would result from legislation removing reversions.
CONCLUSION

Current law allows the sponsor of a terminated defined benefit
plan to take excess plan assets after all plan liabilities have been
satisfied. A heated debate is taking place in Congress and in p'ension
industry circles regarding the wisdom of continuing this policy. Proponents of changing the current system claim excess assets should be
distributed to plan participants. Opponents of reversion legislation
cite ERISA policy, among other things, to support their contentions
that the status quo should be maintained. After considering the
unique nature of the defined benefit plan and the post-ERISA pension system, Congress should not pass any legislation which takes
away, or places substantial constraints on, reversions. This conclusion is grounded in sound policy.
Legislating away reversions violates ERISA's policy of adequate
funding. Underfunded plans reflect insecurity back on participants'
benefits. Additionally, reversion legislation may place the PBGC insurance system in serious financial jeopardy. PBGC financial
problems directly affect plan participants who count on it for benefit
security. Furthermore, reversion legislation destroys the nature of
the defined benefit plan and punishes many for the terminations of a
very few. In the end, the party Congress seeks to assist with rever-

sion legislation, the plan participant, is the party most seriously injured by the legislation.
A better answer lies in legislation which allows the employer,
under specific circumstances and regulations, to withdraw a portion
1143

of excess assets while the plan continues to operate. This legislation
allows the employer to receive a reversion, the participant to continue to accrue future benefits, and does no harm to ERISA policies
or the defined benefit system. In sum, all parties would be benefited,
and the private pension system would "once again" thrive.
JOHN

1144

H. ABBOTT

